Artificial intelligence attracted $355.9 billion, or 86% of the market.
Rounds above $100 million — megadeals — captured 87.5% of total dollars deployed [PitchBook, Q2 2026 US VC Valuations Report].
Formation remains healthy. PitchBook estimates 5,674 first-time financings in the first half, putting 2026 on pace for a record number of companies raising an initial round. Seed investors are still willing to suspend disbelief.
The difficulty arrives at the follow-on.
Later-stage investors want evidence that demand is durable, unit economics are improving and the company has a defensible position in an AI-shaped market. The median pre-money valuation for Series D and later rounds rose above $2 billion — $2,031.4 million, to be precise — more than twice the 2025 level. Series A told a similar story: median pre-money valuation hit $64 million in the second quarter, more than triple 2020’s $21 million. Series C jumped 84.5% year over year to $546 million. The share of flat and down rounds fell to 13.1% of deals, the lowest level since 2022.
A valuation is not a compliment. It is a claim on future performance, and large claims come due.
None of this is evenly distributed. AI companies posted a median 2.2x valuation step-up in 2026, against 1.6x for non-AI. At Series A, AI’s median pre-money valuation runs roughly double non-AI’s; by Series D+, the gap widens to 6.6x. For non-AI startups, a tougher dealmaking environment is simply the new normal.
Nowhere is the concentration clearer than at the very top of the market. SpaceX’s valuation grew 10x in under two years, from $180 billion to $1.8 trillion, and the company single-handedly carried the exit market in the first half — going public, acquiring xAI for $250 billion, and announcing a $60 billion all-stock acquisition of Cursor, the second-largest M&A deal of a VC-backed company on record. One company effectively became the exit market’s entire distribution mechanism. Its IPO priced at $135 a share; by late July it traded around $115.
Of the ten most notable VC-backed listings since 2025, only three — Cerebras, CoreWeave and Circle — trade above their IPO price today; the rest sit underwater, three of them down more than 50%. The active unicorn count hit a record 945 in the second quarter, up 9.4% from year-end 2025, with aggregate unicorn value reaching $5.3 trillion. Private markets keep marking up. Exits keep lagging behind.
Capital sourcing is concentrating as fast as valuations. Corporate venture capital participated in 82.6% of VC deal value in 2026, up from 65.1% in 2025, even as deal count with CVC participation kept shrinking as a share of total activity. Nontraditional investors — hedge funds, sovereign wealth, crossover funds — touched 91.9% of deal value for the year. Both trends point the same direction: fewer, larger checks from fewer, larger sources, concentrated in the names already winning.
Venture debt concentrated along the same lines, reaching $64.7 billion across only 280 loans, with a few enormous AI-infrastructure facilities doing much of the work. Fundraising followed: experienced managers captured 89% of first-half commitments.
Liquidity has not caught up to any of this. Median public listing valuations are essentially flat with 2025 at $862 million, and the median step-up at listing improved only to 1.3x. M&A offers a steadier path — year-to-date acquisition value hit a decade high of $375.4 billion, with the median step-up recovering to 1.9x from 1.2x in 2025 — but a persistent pricing gap between buyers and sellers, absent fresh IPO price discovery, keeps many deals from closing. The secondary market is growing fast, reaching $121.7 billion in annualized value, but it is even more top-heavy than the primary market: the top 20 startups accounted for 86% of second-quarter secondary value on Hiive, with the top five alone capturing 50.3%. A handful of companies are effectively setting the price for everyone else.
A software company adds a customer without manufacturing another unit. A consumer brand buys inventory, packages it, ships it, promotes it, places it on a shelf, waits to be paid, and hopes the shopper returns. Revenue growth can create a financing need before it creates economic value.
Demand is present. June retail and food-services sales reached $768.6 billion, up 6.7% year over year, though the Census figures are nominal. The question is how much of that spending converts into profitable, repeatable demand.
PitchBook’s global food-and-beverage CPG venture dataset recorded $2.0 billion across 369 deals in the first half — a global figure, not a U.S. total, but the pattern holds: fewer, larger, later checks, with strategic acquisitions supplying much of the practical liquidity.
Dedicated capital still exists. Cavu Consumer Partners raised a $325 million fund focused on better-for-you food, beverage, wellness, beauty and pet brands. The significance of a specialist fund, though, is partly that many generalist investors have left the category. Consumer investing increasingly belongs to investors who understand retailer economics, inventory and exit paths.
For most consumer brands the exit is not an IPO. It is a buyer that can add distribution, procurement, manufacturing or category adjacency.
The Marzetti Company acquired Bachan’s for $400 million after the brand produced approximately $87 million of 2025 sales, citing its ability to extend the brand through Marzetti’s retail and foodservice distribution and supply chain. Constellation Brands agreed to acquire the remainder of HOPWTR after first investing through its venture arm in 2021. Danone paid roughly $2 billion for Made Group.
In each case the buyer was purchasing something its system could amplify.
The question a strategic buyer is actually asking: what can we do with this brand that the brand cannot do efficiently on its own?